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Occasional Papers
No. 763

NASTY PROFITS AND NICE INCOMES:
A COMMENT ON EXOTIC ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Stuart Plattner
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It is a decade now since Frank Cancian poured oil upon waters roiled
by substantivist and fonnalist economic anthropologists throwing punches
past each other (1966).

Perhaps to celebrate the anniversary of Cancian's

peace effort, John Dowling resurrects the issues in this volume.

His

distinctions between universal, societal, and sub-societal economic
assumptions, and between economic demand and individual desires are refreshingly clear and quite significant.

He shows that exotic people such

as foragers can be seen as having the same general human values with respect to increased income as industrialized peoples;

if they behave dif-

ferently, if their economic demand is severely restricted, it is because of
the concrete socio-economic conditions of their environment.

Similarly,

his reminder that altruistic behavior and self interest go hand in hand in
tightly-knit communities is valuable.
muddy the waters again.

But he then treats some issues that

I must note that the good parts of Dowling are

original, while the errors are derived from Eric Wolf and Marshall Sahlins,
among others.

In a helpful spirit I offer the following conments.

There is no doubt that it is silly merely to label the agricultural
product of a tribal horticulturalist _as "rent", "wages", or "interest".
It is silly because to label is not to explain -- I will say more about
this below.

Dowling errs when he finds the cause of the silliness in the

lack of a commercial factors market, and therefore concludes that "any
attempt to divide the output of the effort among the factors of production
is meaningless" (p.

).

This is mistaken -- every producti ve process

necessarily has a physical production function associated with it.
adequate data the analyst can estimate this function.

Given

Would it be silly
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to say that an additional unit of land, holding labor constant, yields!.
units of product while an additional unit of labor, holding land constant,
yields y_ units of product? Surely economic anthropology would benefit from
studies such as this.

For even in societies where land and labor are not

measured by the same monetary unit knowledge of their relative productivity
is meaningful.
Herskovits' query about whether to label the subsistence cultivator's
grain as wages or interest was silly because he thought that labelling the
phenomena explained it.

This is a common failing in science and has no

necessary connection with economics or economic anthropology.

The problem

is general and lies in the relation of scientific terms to the theories
they deal with, on one hand, and to the observed reality on the other.
One of the most interesting examples of descriptive labels not meshing
with the analytic matrix they relate to was the Goodenough -- Fischer
debate over Trukese residence (Fischer,

; Goodenough, 1956), which

certainly had nothing to do with economic theory.
Dowling's distinction of profit from gain is an enormous step in the
right direction in the formalist-substantivist literature.
not go into the question deeply enough.

But he does

Profit is well defined, in general,

as the residual share of the product after payments to factors have been
made.

But the leap from this very abstract definition to the conclusion

that peasants are not ever profit-motivated is a serious mistake.
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In the first place there is more to that definition of profit than
meets the eye.

Consider the following sub-definitions of profit as residual

income:
1.

Profit is implicit factor returns.

When all cash payments have

been made to the obvious factors of production (i.e~, rent, interest and
ages) what is left can be interpreted in large part as implicit payments to
factors contributed by the entrepreneur himself -- his own skills, capital
possessions that he contributed part-time, etc.
Profit is the return to innovation and enterprise.

2.

In the real

world economic change is constant, and profits can be seen as the yield of
the entrepreneur's ability to innovate and organize production.
Profit is the implicit return to the bearing of risk by the

3.

entrepreneur.

Ordinary folk exchange some potential long-run income for

security, while the entrepreneur undergoes risk.
ment for that risk-bearing ability.

His profits are the pay-

(Frank Knight, 1921; cf. Samuelson.,

1964; Ch. 29) .

It seems to me that these' concepts are perfectly general.

There is no

necessary connection to a fully commercialized economy inherent in them.
Certainly subsistence fanners, or peasants, have implicit factors of production;
risk.

they innovate and organize their enterprises; and they bear

The application of these concepts to non-monetized societies may be

problematical;

but not so when the subject is a peasant society with

commercial markets.

Why should not the residual share of peasants' income

be conceptualized in the same way?
I believe the answer lies in a deep-seated belief on the part of Wolf

(1957), Sahlins (1972), and many others as well as Dowling that peasants
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are basically different than capitalist fanners.

Wolf claims that peasants

"aim a subsistence and not reinvestment"; while Sahlins resurrects Marx's
distinction between production for use (C - M- C) and production for exchange (M - C - M).

These concepts have been very influential in economic

anthropology, which is regretable because they are gross non-sequitors.
They describe a model of peasant behavior, supposedly unique to peasants,
which fits just as well the behavior of many small, relatively poor businessmen in industrialized societies.

I can testify to this first-hand because

the economic behavior of my own father fits the model exactly.

He opened

an upholstery shop in New York City -- certainly a hot-bed of commercialism-and produced upholstered furniture for retail sale.

He used his own labor,

skills, entrepreneurial ability, and capital for a number of years.

But

he never enlarged his scale of operation, amortised his business, or did
any other fancy thing that Wolf and Sahlins said he should have done.

He

barely made a living and supported his family -- barely subsisted and maintained his social status.

In the end he closed the business bankrupt --

so much for his "production for exchange".

His behavior, as is the be-

havior of millions of other petty businessmen, was essentially similar to
the behavior ascribed to peasants in the works mentioned above.
It is important to note that my father's decision plan -- his economic
values -- included provisions for growth.

If his environment had rewarded

him with a faster rate of sales he would have expanded and reinvested his
capital -- exactly as millions of peasant fanners have done for centuries.
He would have been happy to receive lots and lots of undistributed income,
as so many peasant farmers would be also.

We often forget that peasant

communities are evolving systems, and that the fortunes of individual
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families rise and fall over the generations.

Some few family lines may

till the same plots of land over generations, but many others expand or
contract their holdings.

We similarly forget that the productive sector

in capitalistic societies is not composed solely of millionaires and gigantic
corporations employing teams of economists.

In economic anthropology it

seems as if the income of poor people is dignified and approved of with the
labels "income" or "subsistence", while the income of rich people is
denigrated with the nasty term "profit".

But if profit is undistributed

income then the pennies that poor people earn can be as much profit as
Rockefeller's millions, if they are in excess of factor payments.

Samuelson

wisely points out that "Much of the hostility toward profit is really
hostility toward the extremes of inequality in the distribution of money
income that comes from unequal factor ownership."

(1964: 608).

This in-

equality is indeed nasty and should not be confused with the decision
pJans of individual producers.
The essential question is whether peasants have di f ferent decision
plans than capitalist producers of similar economic status, or similar
plans which interact with different environments to produce exotic behavior.
The specifically peasant-like behavior Dowling analyzes is the phenomena
of target incomes and backward bending supply curves.

Peasants are said to

sell less if prices rise, and more if prices decline, because all they seek
is a "target" sum of money to pay a tax or buy some fixed quantity of goods.
This behavior is attributed to their subsistence motivation.

They are

described as not embedded in the commercial economy, but entering it periodically, perhaps like mermaids flashing in and out of the water.
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Now, backward bending supply curves have a long history in the literature
of economic development.

They first described the reluctance of the natives

to work for the lush wages that European employers held out to them for
laboring on export-oriented plantations, or the reluctance of natives to
produce for market sale the export crops which European trading companies
desired, or the exotic consumption products demanded by European settlers.
In the early stages of colonialism such concepts validated the colonialists'
mandate to rule and to exploit, by demonstrating that the natives were so
devoid of collll10n sense that they were incapable of defending themselves in
the modern world economy.

By the time of the 1960's many economists argued,

and demonstrated with data, that the phenomenon was misinterpreted (Berg,
1961; Dean, 1945; Jones, 1960; Miracle, 1962; Miracle and Fetter, 1970;
Neumark, 1958; Welsch, 1965;).
Marvin Miracle has published a su11111ary article on the subject with
respect to Africa (1976).

He shows that the lack of a response to wage.

levels by African laborers in the early days of European colonization was
attributable to severe "disincentives" connected to working for Europeans
on their plantations or mines.

These "disincentives" included a high rate

of death and disease, malnourishment, undernourishment, substandard housing,
brutal treatment of workers, and a large difference between the real wage
and the apparent wage due to sharp practices _by European empl eyers.

After

presenting data showing that an extensive and lively market trade existed
in Africa before the European presence (cf. also Jones 1960), Miracle
concludes, "thus for these areas at least , if not for Africa generally,
the backward sloping labor supply curve appears entirely consistent with
maximizing (more precisely cost-minimizing) behavior" {p. 406).
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Recently Carol Smith has edited two volumes which illustrate a new
point of view in economic anthropology (1976a and b).

Here the subsistence

farmer's market performance is explained by his relation to a complex,
hierarchical system of market places (see also Smith, 1975).

G. W. Skinner

has also shown that traditional Chinese peasant co1T111unities have opened and
closed in response to changes in their social, economic, ,and political environments.

(1971).

In other wordsw it is possible to explain the seeming irrational or
uniquely peasant aspects of peasant behavior as rational responses to specific,
concrete, albelt extreme environmental parameters.

This is where Dowling

began, in explaining the foragers' low demand for material possessions, and
it is a fine beginning.

I submit, by Occam's razor, that is is better to

have one primary model of human rational choice, which produces different
behaviors under different situational (secondary and tertiary) constraints,
than as many primary models as there are cultural types .

•
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